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THE CERTIFIED QUESTION

The U.S. District Court certified the following question to this Court:
Under Idaho law, when does the statute of limitations begin
to run on a cause of action arising out of an allegedly illegal impact
fee imposed by a local government entity as part of a land use
application?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the brief of Defendant/Respondent Valley County ("County") in response to the
opening brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants Karen White and Elkhorn, LLC (collectively "White").
White is the developer of a residential subdivision in Valley County known as White Cloud.
In this litigation, White challenges a condition in her Conditional Use Permit ("CUP")
compelling her to enter into a Road Development Agreement ("RDA") calling for payment of
$166,496 to mitigate the transportation impacts of Phase I of her deVelopment.
This case is the fourth in a series of after-the-fact challenges to fees charged by Valley
County and the City of McCall.! Others are pending in district court. In each case, developers
paid fees without inquiry or objection at a time when the real estate market was going
huckledebuck. When the market crashed, they turned from development to litigation. As this
Court said recently, "Apparently, Buckskin did not realize that it should not have agreed to make
the payments until after the County had made the road improvements described in the agreements
and the Valley County real estate bubble had burst." Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 493,300 P.3d at 25.
The same may be said of White.
White has already lost most of her claims. All that is left is her damage claim for Phase I
under state law.

! The other three cases are Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley Cnty, 154 Idaho 486,300 P.3d 18
(2013) (J. Jones, J.); Hehr v. City ofMcCall, 2013 WL 3466895 (Idaho, July 11,2013) (Burdick, C.J.);
Alpine Village Co. v. City ofMcCall, _Idaho -,303 P.3d 617 (2013) (Burdick, C.J.).
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First, the federal court threw out White's federal taking claims based on her failure to plead
42 U.S.C. § 1983, her tardiness under the two-year statute oflimitations, and her non-compliance
with Williamson Cnty Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985). Memorandum Order at 15-20 (Dkt. 128, CR000951-56).
Second, White's claims regarding Phase II are now moot. During the course of the
litigation, the County adopted Resolution 11-6 (Dkt. 96-1, CROO 11 07 -10) stating that it would no
longer require road development agreements (unless and until it enacted implementing
ordinances). Phase II has now been built, and the County issued a final plat for Phase II without
any RDA or fee requirement. 2 The project is now complete.
Third, White has abandoned, at least implicitly, her claims for declaratory and/or
injunctive relief as to Phase 1. 3 White's sole argument as to the four-year statute oflimitations is
that the statute begins to run on damage claims when the allegedly illegal fee is paid. White offers
no argument as to why the four-year statute oflimitations has not run on her declaratory and
injunctive relief claims. Indeed, she expressly conceded that she "would have had a legal injury at
the time the CUP was granted" and could have "sustained a cause of action for whether the
conditioning of CUP approval on the payment of an impact fee was legal or illegal." Appellants'

Briefat 9.

2 This was fully documented in briefing and affidavits submitted to the federal court: "There is no
longer any basis for injunctive relief. The County approved the final plat for Phase II on December 19,
2011. In accordance with Resolution 11-6, it included no road fee requirement or any requirement for a
development agreement. See status reports (Dkt. 131, 132, and 133)." Valley County's Response Briefin
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 (Dkt. 142, CROO 1052). In Buckskin, by the
way, this Court reached the same conclusion as to mootness based on the same resolution. Buckskin, 154
Idaho at 498-500,300 P.3d at 28-30. Here, mootness is even clearer, because the County has now
approved White's final plat.
3 White's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 41, CROOOO 18-24) lists nine items under its prayer.
Only one (number 7) is in the nature of damages. The first six are for declaratory and/or injunctive relief,
and the last two are boilerplate.
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The County is defending the road fees on several grounds, including that White's
challenge was tardy and that the payment was voluntary.4 When the federal court denied the
County's motion for summary judgment on those defenses, the County urged the federal court to
certify these questions to the Idaho Supreme Court, specifically citing the Hehr and Buckskin
cases, whose decisions at the trial court level were at odds with the federal court's holding and
which were then on appeal to this Court. The federal court agreed to certify one of the suggested
questions-the one dealing with the statute of limitations-and this Court accepted the
certification.
The federal court assumed, incorrectly, that there are two distinct causes of action.
Although the certified question is broadly framed, the federal court's commentary in its order
focuses on only one cause of action. Meanwhile, the federal court has misapplied Idaho law as to
the other cause of action. (See footnote 20 at page 28.) The County's position is that White's case
consists of a single cause of action, informally known as inverse condemnation. That cause of

4 Although the certified question is limited to the technical defense of timeliness, the County also
contends that White's lawsuit fails on the merits. The argument on the merits is still pending before the
federal district court. See Opening Brief in Support of Valley County's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2-6 (CROOlO09-13). The County's position on the merits is strengthened by this Court's
recent ruling in Buckskin:
Furthennore, even without the agreement of the developer, a
governing board may attach a condition to a CUP requiring the provision
for off-site public facilities or requiring mitigation of effects of the
proposed development upon service delivery by any political subdivision.
I.C. § 67-6512(d)(6) and (8).
Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 492,300 P.3d at 24. The holding in Buckskin flows from the Court's earlier
explanation in Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty Bd. of Comm 'rs ("Burns Holdings If'), 152 Idaho 440,
444,272 P.3d 412, 416 (2012) (Eismann, J.):
A CUP is used for classifications of uses that the zoning authority
has determined will be permitted only if it is allowed to require specified
types of conditions that are typically developed on a case-by-case basis in
order to mitigate the adverse effects that the development and/or operation
of the proposed use may have upon other properties or upon the ability of
political subdivisions to provide services for the proposed use. Section
67-6512(d) includes a non-exhaustive list of the types of conditions that
can be attached to a CUP.
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action encompasses White's allegation that the road fees are illegal taxes and, because they are
illegal, constitute a taking and deprivation of due process. All of these state law allegations are
bound together and are governed by a single application of the statute of limitations. Even if the
Court were to view the case as consisting of distinct causes of action, each of them is subject to
the same accrual date-the date on which it became apparent that White's property would be
taken. While the federal court correctly recited the words of this Court in describing that standard,
it misapplied the standard here. This Court cannot meaningfully respond to the certified question
without sorting out the underlying cause( s) of action.
ARGUMENT

I.

WHITE PRESENTS A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION-INVERSE CONDEMNATION-WITH
A SINGLE ACCRUAL DATE.

A.

The federal court incorrectly assumed that White presents two,
independent causes of action.

The federal court's order certifying this question to this Court includes some commentary
on the nature of this litigation and the causes of action involved. (Certification Order, Dkt. 151.)
That commentary is based on a misunderstanding that is important to correct because it directly
relates to the analysis of the certified question and the applicable authorities.
Tracking White's complaint, the federal court describes two separate claims for relief: the
first being "Plaintiff's illegal tax claim" and the second being her "inverse condemnation claims."
Certification Order at 7. In fact, there is only one cause of action available to White-inverse
condemnation. That encompasses her request for damages of $166,496 as well as associated
declaratory and injunctive relief. All the relief sought is based on the same conduct of the County,
the same CUP, and the same alleged violation of law-the "illegal tax" premise. If the CUP and

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
1798766_33,10915·11

Page 10 of48

RDA required payment of an illegal tax, then, ipso facto, that is a per se taking. 5 That is the only
reason it is alleged to be a taking. 6 One cannot separate the two. Accordingly, they are subject to
a single accrual date regardless of how White pled them.
The federal court's assumption that there are two causes of action with separate accrual
dates reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of the claims. The federal court also
misapprehends the County's position and the trial court's ruling in Hehr v. City of McCall, Case
No. CV-2010-276C (Idaho, June 16,2011), Dkt. 106-1, CR 000925-36, ajJ'd 2013 WL 3466895
(Idaho, July 11,2013). The federal court said, "The County did not make any arguments with
regard to an accrual date for Plaintiffs illegal tax claim." Certification Order at 7. It would be
more accurate to say that the County did not make any argument with respect to a separate accrual
date for Plaintiffs illegal tax claim. The County has never perceived that there is any difference
between the~claims, and neither did the district court in its well-reasoned opinion in Hehr (Dkt.
106-1, CR 000925-36).
It appears, however, that the federal court did not understand that opinion. The federal

court stated:
The decision in Hehr, however, also indicates that the
accrual date for the inverse condemnation claim was not the same
date on which all of the plaintiffs actionable claims accrued ....
. .. [T]he trial court in Hehr concluded that the accrual date
for an inverse condemnation claim is not necessarily the same date
5 "Since the City had no authority to charge the liquor license transfer fee, its exaction of the fee
constituted a taking of property under the United States and Idaho Constitutions." BHA Investments, Inc. v.
City ofBoise ("BHA 11'), 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004) (Eismann, J.).
6

White also alleges a due process violation. That, too, is based entirely on the illegal tax premise.

As this Court said in KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003) (Eismann,
J.), and quoted again in Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 495,300 P.3d at 27, such a due process violation is bound

up in the taking claim, all of which is encompassed in the inverse condemnation cause of action: "A
property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein, has been invaded or
appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of law and the payment of just
compensation, may bring an action for inverse condemnation."
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on which all claims challenging the imposition of an allegedly
illegal tax accrue.
Certification Order at 13-14.

In fact, the state district court drew no such distinction. It dismissed the entire case, not
certain claims, and it applied the four-year statute oflimitations and the inverse condemnation
accrual analysis to all state-law based claims.
It appears that the federal court misunderstood the state district court's statement that "[i]t

was clear that the Plaintiffs had an actionable claim even before the signing of the Development
Agreement based on the record before the Court." State court decision at 6, CR000930 (quoted by
federal court in the Certification Order at 14). That was not a reference to some other actionable
claim. The state court was simply observing that the cause of action for inverse condemnation
actually accrued even earlier than the date the development agreement was signed. However,
since the RDA was more than four years out, there was no need to trace the accrual date back any
earlier. This is similar to the district court's holding in the Buckskin case. "On January 7, 2011,
the district court issued its initial decision, holding that the four-year statute of limitations began to
run, at the very latest, on October 25,2004 .... " Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 489,300 P.3d at 21
(emphasis supplied).
This Court upheld the district court's decisions in both Hehr and Buckskin, but found it
unnecessary to reach the statute of limitations in either case. Nothing in those opinions, however,
hints at the idea that there is a different statute oflimitations analysis for "inverse condemnation"
versus "illegal tax" claims. In fact, in Hehr, this Court described the plaintiffs claims as follows:
"Greystone brought inverse condemnation claims against McCall alleging that the conveyance of
the nine lots and the improvements made to those lots constituted an illegal taking under both the
Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution." Hehr, 2013 WL 3466895 at *1. There is
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no mention of any separate "illegal tax" claim despite the fact that White's "First Claim for
Relief' in the Second Amended Complaint is very similar to the "First Claim for Relief' in the
First Amended Complaint in Hehr. CR000021; Hehr CR at 4-5. Similarly, in Buckskin, this

Court described the plaintiffs' damage claims as inverse condemnation claims and nothing else.
Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 494-496,300 P.3d at 26-28. As with the instant case and Hehr, the
Complaint in Buckskin contained substantially the same "First Claim for Relief." Buckskin CR at

4-5.
B.

White's single cause of action is inverse condemnation based on an
illegal tax.

The fact that White chose to divide her complaint into two "claims for relief' does not
change the reality that there is only one central, underlying cause of action presented in this
litigation (and, hence, a single application of the statute oflimitations). White's case turns on a
single question: Did the County act without authority in requiring developers like her to pay road
fees to mitigate the impact of their developments? If the answer to that question is "yes," then the
County would be obligated to return the $166,496 White paid to the County and, if the issue were
not moot, White would be entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief as to those and any future
road fees.
White's challenge is framed as a Dillon's Rule case-a unique type of taking rooted in
Idaho's constitutional provisions dealing with taxation. Idaho is a Dillon's Rule state, Caesar v.
State, 101 Idaho 158, 160, 610 P .2d 517, 519 (1980), meaning that the power to tax (found in

Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6) is separate from the police power, is not self-executing, and must be
conferred by the Legislature. Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. City 0/ Coeur d'Alene
("IBCA "),126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Brewster v. City o/Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768

P.2d 765 (1988). White contends that local governments have no authority to impose road fees on
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developers outside of the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code §§ 67-8201
to 67-8216. 7
The Dillon's Rule violation alleged by White is a different sort of regulatory taking than
the NollanlDolan exaction variety (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)) common in federal takings claims under the
Fifth Amendment. The Nollanl Dolan cases require that exactions have a nexus and be in rough
proportionality to the impact of the project for which approval is sought. There is no allegation
here that the road fees imposed by the County lack nexus or proportionality to the transportation
impacts of the development. 8
The sole basis of White's suit is whether the road fees demanded by the County violate
Idaho's constitutional provision regarding taxing authority. The taking and due process claims
have no independent viability separate from the illegal tax premise. They are simply the
consequence of the allegedly illegal tax.
In her Second Amended Complaint, White posed this question in various ways and
requested various forms of relief. But it all comes down to the same question. That question was
presented to the court in a cause of action commonly known as inverse condemnation.
An inverse condemnation case is simply a condemnation case in which the parties are
reversed from the order in an ordinary condemnation case, with the landowner suing the

7 As the federal court correctly noted: "The County concedes it did not enact an lOIPA-compliant
ordinance, because, at the time, the County believed in good faith that none was required." Certification
Order at 4. Indeed, the County still believes that none is required. See footnote 4 at page 6. See also
Resolution 11-6 (Dkt. 96-1, CROOl107-1O).

8 To the contrary, White describes the fees as being charged for the "proportionate share of road
improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development." Second Amended Complaint,
,16 at p. 4 (CR000021); see also" 12 and 14, 17.
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government for compensation (and/or other relief) resulting from a taking. 9
As the Court explained in Rueth v. State ("Rueth 1'), 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1982)
(Bistline, J.), appeal/allowing remand, Rueth v. State ("Rueth 11'), 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333
(1982) (McFadden, J.), an inverse condemnation action finds its basis in the self-executing
constitutional provision on takings:
In Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911 (1950) the
Court stated tersely but accurately that that action, which sought
damages for the permanent although intermittent flooding of the
property owners' lands, was in essence "a condemnation suit in
reverse." Id. at 177, 213 P .2d 911. The final paragraph of that
opinion said this: "Because this is, in effect, a condemnation suit
and the condemnor must bear all costs, costs are awarded (to)
appellants." Id. at 179,213 P.2d at 917. It is clear that the Court
there considered that what is now popularly called an action in
inverse condemnation is nevertheless a proceeding in eminent
domain and the only difference is the reversed alignment of the
parties. The Court there noted that "Article 1, Section 14 of the
Constitution ofIdaho, is mandatory that private property may not be
taken until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner
prescribed by law, is paid." !d. at 177,213 P.2d at 915. The Court
there reiterated what an earlier Court had said in Bassett v. Swenson,
51 Idaho 256, 5 P .2d 722 (1931), that this constitutional provision is
self-executing, that is, '''No action of the Legislature further than
providing the procedural machinery by which the right may be
applied is necessary.'" 1d., 70 Idaho at 177,213 P.2d at 915. The
import of that holding is clear. Both the right to condemn and the
right of the condemnee to just compensation are granted, not by the
legislature, but by the Constitution. The Court in Renninger, supra,
repeated the holding from Bassett, supra, that '''whether or not a
right claimed under this provision of the Constitution is within the
grant is held to be a judicial question to be determined by the
9 "An inverse condemnation action is an eminent domain proceeding initiated by the property
owner rather than the condemnor." Covington v. Jeffirson Cnty, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828,831
(2002) (Trout, J.). "Inverse condemnation is a taking of private property for a public use without the
commencement of condemnation proceedings." Wadsworth v. Idaho Dep 't a/Transportation, 128 Idaho
439,441,915 P.2d 1,3 (1996) (Schroeder, J.). "Inverse condemnation is 'a shorthand description of the
manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation
proceedings have not been instituted.'" Agins v. City a/Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980» (Powell, J.). "Such a suit is 'inverse' because it is brought by
the affected owner, not by the condemnor." Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1,5 n.
6 (1984) (Marshall, J.).
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courts.'" Id. at 177,213 P.2d at 915. In the ordinary situation the
constitutional right to condemn is exercised by the party seeking to
take private property. In the "reverse" situation the constitutional
right to be paid just compensation is exercised by the property
owner who brings the action, alleging that his property rights have
been taken without payment.
Rueth I, 100 Idaho at 217-18, 596 P.2d at 89-90 (emphasis supplied). JO

The point of all this is that inverse condemnation is simply a "shorthand description" (as
the Court said in Clarke) for a self-executing cause of action that affords relief to persons alleging
their property is being taken. In contrast, there is no "cause of action" for the abstract claim that

10 The U.S. Supreme Court offered similar commentary on the nature of inverse condemnation and
the origin ofthe term, which is entirely consistent with what the Idaho Supreme Court has said:
Although a landowner's action to recover just compensation for a taking
by physical intrusion has come to be referred to as "inverse" or "reverse"
condemnation, the simple terms "condemn" and "condemnation" are not
commonly used to describe such an action. Rather, a "condemnation"
proceeding is commonly understood to be an action brought by a
condemning authority such as the Government in the exercise of its power
of eminent domain. . ..

. . . The phrase "inverse condemnation" appears to be one that was coined
simply as a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner
recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted. As defined by one
land use planning expert, "[i]nverse condemnation is 'a cause ofaction
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which
has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency. ", D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development
Control Law 328 (1971) (emphasis added). A landowner is entitled to
bring such an action as a result of "the self-executing character of the
constitutional provision with respect to compensation.... " See 6 P.
Nichols, Eminent Domain § 25.41 (3d rev.ed.1972). A condemnation
proceeding, by contrast, typically involves an action by the condemnor to
effect a taking and acquire title. The phrase "inverse condemnation," as a
common understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply describes an
action that is the "inverse" or "reverse" of a condemnation proceeding.
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-57 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.) (emphasis original).
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the government is charging illegal taxes. It is the allegation that the illegal taxes take property that
opens the doors to the courthouse by providing standing and a functional cause of action. 11
Inverse condemnation claims come in various forms. The most common are physical
takings and the NollanlDolan variety of regulatory taking. The particular species of inverse
condemnation involved here is a claim based on an alleged illegal tax. The federal court is
mistaken in its assumption that an inverse condemnation claim can be separated from the illegal
tax claim under Idaho law.
This Court, obviously, is not bound by the federal court's commentary on Idaho law. Nor
is this Court bound to answer the certified question in the particular structure or format urged by
the federal court. The County is aware of this Court's admonition:
When the "question presented is a narrow one," as it is here, "[o]ur
role is limited to answering the certified question." Peone v.
Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 374, 375, 744 P.2d 102, 103
(1987) (cautioning that "to now decide [extraneous matters] would
result in an advisory opinion on a question not certified").

St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 40, 293 P.3d 661, 664
(2013) (quotation marks and brackets original).
However, as noted by Justices Bistline and Huntley in their dissent in Peone, this Court
had previously recognized its ability to reformulate a certified question. Peone, 113 Idaho at 388,
744 P.2d at 116 (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987)).
Where the case involves important state law issues besides those specifically asked in the certified
question, courts and commentators have advocated for the state court to address the issues.
The certification process is the only opportunity for direct dialogue
between a federal and a state court. We think it pointless to tum a
II A person who pays an unauthorized fee or tax to a governmental entity might also be able to
assert a cause of action for conversion. However, such a claim would require a timely notice of claim
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, which was not served in this matter.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
1798766_33, 10915·11

Page 17 of48

deaf ear to all but the direct responses to formal questions where, as
here, other important issues clearly are implicated. To do so would
be to elevate form over substance, to ignore a helpful opportunity to
interpret state law correctly, and to demean the principles of comity
and federalism. "In the absence of a definitive ruling by the highest
state court, a federal court may consider 'analogous decisions,
considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data
tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state
would decide the issue at hand,' taking into account the broad
policies and trends so evinced." Michelin Tires (Canada) Ltd. v.
First National Bank ofBoston, 666 F.2d 673, 682 (I st
Cir.1981 ) (quoting McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622
F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir.1980)).
As two commentators recently have noted:
[T]he ability of the answering court to
reshape or add to the issues is necessary to
further the goals of certification. The
answering court may be best situated to
frame the question for precedential value
and to control the development of its laws. If
state courts take offense at a poorly framed
question, they may miss a genuine
opportunity to settle state law on a particular
point.
Corr & Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of
Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 411,426 (1988). See also Martinez v.
Rodriquez, 394 F.2d 156, 159 n. 6 (5th Cir.1968) (form of certified
question should "not ... restrict the [state] Supreme Court's
consideration of the problems involved and the issues as the
Supreme Court perceives them to be in its analysis of the record
certified ... , [including] the Supreme Court's restatement of the
issue or issues and the manner in which the answers are to be given,
whether as a comprehensive whole or in subordinate or
even contingent parts") (emphasis supplied); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Caguas Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n ofPuerto
Rico, 825 F.2d 536,537 (1st Cir.1986) (welcoming the advice of the
answering court "on any other question of Puerto Rican law material
to this case on which it would like to comment").
Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir.1988).

In sum, this Court can and should answer the certified question in the context ofIdaho law
as it finds it.
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II.

WHITE'S CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED WHEN A SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE
WITH HER PROPERTY BECAME APPARENT.

The federal court instructed this Court how to approach its response to the certified
question: "This [federal] Court is not asking the Idaho Supreme Court to address the accrual date
for inverse condemnation claims." Certification Order at 11. However, as discussed in the prior
section, this instruction is based on a misunderstanding ofIdaho law. This Court cannot fairly and
meaningfully answer the certified question without addressing the accrual date for inverse
condemnation, because that is the underlying cause of action. Doing so is particularly important,
because it is evident that the federal court misperceives Idaho law on the subject of the accrual
date.
The parties agree that White's state-law taking claim (as opposed to her federal taking
claim) is subject to Idaho Code § 5-224. Let us begin, then, with the words of that statute: "An
action for relief not hereinafter provided for must be commenced within four (4) years after the
cause of action shall have accrued." Idaho Code § 5-224 (emphasis supplied). Thus, if White's
cause of action accrued before October 1, 2005, her lawsuit is untimely.
Indeed, in seven cases, this Court has stated that claims of inverse condemnation run from
the time that a substantial interference with the subject property "becomes apparent." The seminal
case is Tibbs v. City a/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979) (Thomas, 1. pro tern.). In
that case, the plaintiffs alleged a taking based on the city's expansion of an airport and the adverse
effects of increased air traffic on plaintiffs' property. The Court stated:
The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact
determination, is to be fixed at the point in time at which the
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial
interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent.
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Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 671,603 P.2d at 1005 (emphasis supplied).12
The first case to quote Tibbs was Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79,644 P.2d 1333, 1338
(1982) (McFadden, J.). Like Tibbs, Rueth was an inverse condemnation case in which evaluating
the extent of damages was at issue. Both cases, however, dealt with the question of when the
taking occurs and, hence, have laid the foundation for determining when statute of limitations
begins to run. In Rueth, the plaintiffs operated a dairy farm whose land had gradually become
saturated due to a water diversion structure built by the Idaho Department ofFish and Game. The
Court recited the guidelines set out in Tibbs and concluded that it was appropriate for the trial
court to select the date of a meeting in which the parties recognized "the severity of the problem":
Because of the gradual nature of the taking in this case, and because
of the character of a taking through a rising groundwater table, it
would have been impossible to pick a specific date on which it could
be said clearly that the taking occurred. Nonetheless, the agreement
ofthe Department of October 4, 1974, to remove the boards from
the irrigation check structure represents a recognition of the severity
of the problem, and the evidence supports this date as a reasonable
one for purposes of fixing the date of actual taking.

Rueth, 103 Idaho at 79,644 P.2d at 1338 (emphasis supplied).
The next case to quote Tibbs was Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 111 Idaho 878,
880, 728 P.2d 767, 769 (1986) (Donaldson, J.). This is the first time that the Tibbs guidance was
applied in the context of the statute oflimitations. The Intermountain West case was a
downzoning case involving annexation in which a developer sued the city for issuing stop work
orders. The Court rejected the inverse condemnation damage claims on the merits and under the
statute of limitations. As to the latter, the Court said:

Curiously, the Tibbs case did not actually involve the statute oflimitations. The case was an
action for inverse condemnation where the impact on the neighboring property was gradual. The question
in the case was how to value the decline in property value, and the reference to when the case arose was in
the context of fixing the dates for determination of "the difference in the value of the property before and
after the destruction or impairment of the access." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670,603 P.2d at 1004.
12
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In any event, it is clear that appellant's claim in inverse
condemnation is barred by the statute oflimitations. Guidelines
expressed by this Court in Tibbs v. City 0/ Sandpoint, 100 Idaho
667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979) tell us that a cause of action in an inverse
condemnation case accrues "after the full extent of the plaintiff s
loss of use and enjoyment of [the premises] become[s] apparent."
!d. at 671 (quoting Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798,802, 160
Ct.Cl. 295 (Ct.C1.1963)). The accrual of this action commenced no
later than July 30, 1975, when the court issued an injunction against
Intermountain.
Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 111 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769.13 In other words, the

Court found that the interference with the property must have been apparent by the time the city
secured an order requiring Intermountain West stop work. Note that the Court said that the cause
of action accrued "no later" than that date. There was no need for the Court to trace back the
accrual date any earlier.
A decade later, in Wadsworth v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 443,
915 P.2d 1,5 (1996) (Schroeder, J.), the Court quoted the Tibbs guidance once again. Wadsworth
involved a cross-claim for inverse condemnation filed by a landowner against the Department of
Transportation alleging that the agency's gravel excavation many years earlier caused his island to
erode.
The Court quoted Tibbs, highlighting the words "becomes apparent" to emphasize this is
when the cause of action accrues. Wadsworth, 128 Idaho at 442,915 P.2d at 4. The Court also
reiterated its holding in Rueth: "This Court held that a meeting between the parties was a
'recognition ofthe severity of the problem,' and fixed that date as the date ofthe actual taking."
Wadsworth, 128 Idaho at 442-43,915 P.2d at 4-5.

13 The quotation of Tibbs by the Court in Intermountain West was slightly inaccurate, but that error
is of no consequence.
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The Court concluded that, while Wadsworth may not have been aware of the full impact of
the excavation when it occurred in 1962, the interference with his property interest must have been
apparent when he filed a tort claim alleging specific damages in 1983-seven years before he filed
suit. The Court surnmed up saying that the statute begins to run "when the impairment was of
such a degree and kind that substantial interference with Wadsworth's property interest became
apparent." Wadsworth, 128 Idaho at 443,915 P.2d at 5.
The Court repeatedly cited to Tibbs in McCuskey v. Canyon Cnty Comm 'rs ("McCuskey

11'),128 Idaho 213, 217-19,912 P.2d 100,104-06 (1996) (Trout, J.). In this case, the plaintiff
claimed a temporary taking from the time Canyon County issued a stop work order to the time the
Idaho Supreme Court voided the controlling ordinance in McCuskey v. Canyon Cnty ("McCuskey

1'), 123 Idaho 657,851 P.2d 953 (1993) (Bistline, J.). In McCuskey II, the Court explained that
the statute began to run from the day the county interfered with his property, not the day the Court
ruled the interference was illegal.
In determining when the cause of action for an inverse
condemnation claim accrues we note that while a taking is typically
initiated when government acts to condemn property, the doctrine of
inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking
may occur without such formal proceedings. In such an informal
taking this Court has decided that damages for inverse
condemnation should be assessed at the time the taking occurs. The
time of taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of
the time that the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and
enjoyment of the property becomes apparent. In this case,
McCuskey was fully aware of the extent to which Canyon County
interfered with his full use and enjoyment of the property in question
on November 13, 1986, the date that McCuskey was notified, via
issuance of a stop-work order, that he could not build the
convenience store.

McCuskey IL 128 Idaho at 216-17,912 P.2d at 103-04 (citations omitted).
McCuskey had contended that the statute did not begin to run until the Court had ruled the
county's zoning action illegal, because only then did he know the full extent of damages for the
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temporary taking. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that the lack of quantification of
the loss is not an excuse for delay in filing the 1awsuit: 14
Moreover, it is well settled that uncertainty as to the amount of
damages cannot bar recovery so long as the underlying cause of
action is determined. Besides, although McCuskey may not have
known the full extent of his damages at the time the stop-work order
was issued, he would have known with certainty what they were
once a taking had been finally adjudicated.
McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 218,912 P.2d at 105 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court's earlier

quoted reference to knowing "the full extent of the plaintiff s loss" should be understood to mean
that the clock begins to run when interference with plaintiffs property is sufficiently apparent that
a cause of action has arisen, regardless of whether the full extent of damages is then known.
The Tibbs guidance was applied ten years later in City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142
Idaho 839, 846, 136 P.3d 310,317 (2006). In this case, the city filed suit seeking an injunction
requiring a landowner to remove fences on 1akefront property. The landowner counterclaimed
under § 1983 for inverse condemnation. The Court found that the landowner's counterclaim was
timely, despite the fact that the applicable ordinance had been on the books for more than four
years. The Court explained that it was not the enactment of the ordinance but its application to the
landowner that triggered the statute oflimitations:
A claim for inverse condemnation "accrues after the full extent of
the impairment of the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of [the property]
becomes apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671,
603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (quoting Aaron v. United States, 160
Ct. Cl. 295, 311 F.2d 798, 802 (1963)). In Palazzolo [v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 608-09 (2001)], the United States Supreme
Court held that a regulatory takings claim does not become ripe
upon enactment of the regulation; indeed, it remains unripe until the
Thus, in McCuskey II, the Court traced the starting point back earlier than the issuance of the
stop work injunction in Intermountain West. The cases are not inconsistent, however. As noted above, it
was not necessary for the Court in Intermountain West to look back any earlier than the stop work
injunction.
14
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landowner takes the reasonable and necessary steps to allow the
regulating agency to consider development plans and issue a
decision, thereby determining the extent to which the regulation
actually burdens the property.

Simpson, 142 Idaho at 846, 136 P.3d at 317.15
The Simpson Court concluded that the cause of action did not begin to run until the city
initiated an enforcement action against the landowners. "More important, however, is the fact that
the City brought this action in 1998 to require removal of the fences constructed by the Simpsons
in 1997. The issue was joined atthat time." Simpson, 142 Idaho at 846, 136 P .3d at 317.16
The Tibbs guidance was quoted once again in Harris v. State, ex reI. Kempthorne, 147
Idaho 401, 405, 210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009) (Burdick, J.). This case grew out of confusion over
whether the State ofIdaho owned mineral rights to sand and gravel on the Harris's property in
Latah County. In 1983, the State Land Board determined that the State owned the mineral rights,
informed the Harrises, and required them to enter into a mineral lease under which they made
payments to the State for sand and gravel removed. In 1999, this Court determined in an unrelated
case that the State did not own the rights. The State then informed the Harrises that they were
relieved from the obligation to make further payments under the lease. The Harrises sued in

15 Palazzolo does not even deal with the statute of limitations. Rather, it applied the specialized
ripeness test in Williamson Cnty Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985) (Blackmun, J.). Palazzolo sets out the basic premise that Williamson Cnty ripeness requires that
the landowner go through proceedings resulting in a final decision. Palazzolo also created, however, a
futility exception making this unnecessary where the ordinance leaves no room for discretion. "While a
landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once it becomes clear
that the agency lacks the discretion to permit any development, or the permissible uses of the property are
known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened." Palazzolo, 53 U.S. at

620.

16 This makes sense in this context, where the city initiates an enforcement action under an
ambiguous statute involving prosecutorial discretion. Thus, it would seem that while it is true that mere
enactment of an unconstitutional ordinance does not start the statute of limitations running, the statute
could begin to run where a landowner initiated an application process under a statute that absolutely
(facially) required a taking in every instance. But that is a question for another day.
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inverse condemnation demanding reimbursement for payments already made. The Harrises
contended that the statute oflimitations should be suspended when the State misinformed them as
to the ownership of the mineral rights. This Court affirmed the district court's ruling that there is
no such exception. The Court then ruled that the statute oflimitations on inverse condemnation
ran from the day the plaintiffs first entered into the mineral lease with the State, not the time they
made payments to the State under the lease. It said:
We affirm the district court's determination that the full extent of the
Harrises' loss of use and enjoyment of the property became apparent
when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point in time, the
impairment constituted a substantial interference with their property
interest because they signed an agreement promising to pay royalties
and rents on the sand and gravel. Therefore, the Harrises are barred
from recovering under their inverse condemnation claim by I.C.
§ 5-224.
Harris, 147 Idaho 405,210 P.3d 90. Since they signed the lease 16 years before bringing suit,

there was no need for the Court to explore whether the statute might have begun to run even
earlier (such as when they were first informed ofthe State's ownership). The Court found that the
mineral lease, in any event, was sufficient to satisfy the Tibbs standard that the interference with
their property "became apparent." Harris, 147 Idaho at 405,210 P.3d at 90 (quoting Tibbs).
Thus, for 34 years, this Court has articulated a consistent guideline for when a cause of
action arises and when the statute oflimitations begins to run. 17 White does not discuss these

17 This Court has never questioned the "becomes apparent" rule in the context in which it applies.
Note, however, that a special rule applies in the case of certain physical takings resulting from government
construction projects. There, the statute does not begin to run until the construction project is complete.
C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) (Kidwell, J.). This is
referred to as the "project completion rule." C & G, 139 Idaho at 146, 75 P.3d at 200. This rule makes
sense where a government construction project will physically invade a person's property. In that situation,
the landowner cannot stop the government from undertaking the construction project. Rather, the only
issue is the amount of compensation due. Consequently, it makes sense to wait until the project is
completed and the facts are clear. In contrast, in exaction cases, courts have the power to stop the exaction
either before or after it takes place by invalidating the exaction condition. Hence, there is no need to wait
until the exact dollar value of the exaction is known, and no reason to delay the accrual of a cause of action.
Indeed, the C & G court specifically noted: "This analysis should not be taken as a reversal of McCuskey
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authorities, instead focusing on the misguided theory that there is a separate "illegal tax" claim
with a different accrual date. But Idaho is clear that a cause of action based on a regulatory taking
of property arises when it becomes "apparent" that the property will be taken. There is no basis
under Idaho law to argue that the rule is any different for takings based on an allegedly illegal tax
than for any other sort of regulatory taking. Accordingly, the application of these authorities
results in White's case being barred.
Although the County believes the better approach is to view White's case as encompassing
a single cause of action, the same result would obtain if the Court applied the statute of limitations
separately to the "illegal tax" and "inverse condemnation" claims. Both claims are tardy.

III.

IN WHITE'S CASE, THE INTERFERENCE WITH HER PROPERTY BECAME APPARENT
WHEN THE CUP ISSUED.

As discussed above, the statute oflimitations begins to run when it becomes apparent that
a party's property has or will suffer a substantial impairment. In White's case, her cause of action
accrued when the CUP was issued, or, in the alternative, very soon thereafter. The basis for this
conclusion begins with the CUP itself, which contains condition No.6 stating "A Development
Agreement shall be required with the Board of County Commissioners" CDkt. 64-19, CR000395).
This requirement was imposed in accordance with the County's then recently adopted Capital
Improvement Program ("CIP"), which mandated road fees to mitigate the impacts of
development. 18

where this Court refused to apply Farber's project completion rule to determine when an inverse
condemnation claim accrues." C & G, 139 Idaho 144, 75 P.3d 198.
18 A copy of the entire CIP does not appear in the record. However, the critical portion of the CIP
that sets out the fee structure for the region containing the White Cloud development is found at Dkt. 48-2,
CR000080-81; Dkt. 64-18, CR000392-93. The CIP is also described in the Valley County Master
Transportation Plan, Dkt. 64-5, CR000307-08.
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This is not in dispute. White acknowledges that the road fee was imposed "pursuant to
Valley County's implementation of a Capital Improvement Program ('CIP') and requirement that
White enter into a Road Development Agreement ('RDA')." Appellants' Briefat 1. White further
acknowledges: "Under the CIP, developers were required to pay a fee, construct in-kind
improvements on existing roadways or dedicate rights-of-way in an amount calculated by the
County's engineer to deal with impacts on county roads." Appellants' Brief at 2. The CIP is dated
May 2005, more than four years before the Verified Complaint was filed on October 1, 2009
(Dkt. 1, CR000001).
As part of the CIP, the County developed a fee calculation specific to each region of the
County, based on local road impacts from development. At the time the CUP issued, the regional
fee calculation matrix for the White Cloud area had not been completed, but it was underway. A
letter from the County Engineer, included in the Staff Report for the CUP decision, stated:
"Valley County will require a Road Development Agreement (RDA) for this project. Valley
County is in the process of developing a CIP for this area" (Dkt. 64-22, CR000402; Dkt. 69-2,
CR000559).
Thus, at the time the CUP issued, White did not yet know the exact amount of money she
would be charged for road fees. But she knew with certainty that fees would be imposed.
In any event, White's designated representative learned within four months-more than
four years before the complaint was filed-what the fees would be for each lot. On August 24,
2005, Cody Jansen (employed by the County's Engineer) sent a copy of the draft RDA, with fees
specified, to White's agent, Secesh Engineering. 19 Declaration o/Cody Janson at 3, ~ 6 (Dkt.

19 Secesh Engineering was White's designated engineer and representative before the Planning and
Zoning Commission. Secesh's name appears on the CUPlPreliminary Plat Application, Dkt. 69-1
CR000523. Indeed, it was Secesh itself who submitted CUPlPreliminary Plat Application, Dkt. 69, Exh. A,
CR000522. Throughout the application process, Secesh acted on behalf of White in her dealings with the
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104-1, CR000887); Draft RDA (Dkt. 104-1, CR000889-92). The draft RDA called for road fees
of$3,784 per lot. This is identical to the amount per lot charged in the RDA that White signed on
June 26,2006. (The total dollar number changed only because the number oflots changed.)
Thus, it was clear when the CUP was issued on May 24, 2005 that road fees would be required.
And it was soon known exactly what those fees would be per 101. 20
But even if the exact fee were not known, it makes no difference. The amount ofthe fee is
irrelevant to the constitutional question of whether the charge is a lawful fee or an illegal tax.
Hence, the cause of action accrues as soon as it is known that a fee will be charged-i.e., that there
will be a substantial impairment of property. White's sole argument is that the County failed to
comply with the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to
67 -8216, which makes its road fee an illegal tax and a per se taking under BHA Investments, Inc.

County. For example, the Minutes of the Planning and Zoning Commission hearing on the development
state: "Chairman Somerton asked for the presentation from the applicant. Jim Fronk, Secesh Engineering,
came forward and presented to the Commission ...." Dkt. 91-6, CR000819. Further documentation of the
agency relationship is found in the Declaration of Cynda Herrick Regarding Secesh Engineering and
accompanying exhibits (Dkt. 120 through 120-15, CROOll13-93).
It is black letter law that knowledge acquired by an agent during the course ofthe agency
relationship is imputed to the principal so long as the agent did not have any interest adverse to the
principal. Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 433,871 P.2d 846,850 (1994) (citing Kidwell
v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 458,615 P.2d 116, 127 (1980) and Williams v. Continental Life
& Accident Co., 100 Idaho 71, 72-73, 593 P.2d 708, 709-10 (1979». In Mason, the plaintiff argued that the
statute of limitations on his claim should have been tolled based upon equitable estoppe1. The Court held
that, even if the elements of equitable estoppel applied, it would only toll the statute until the plaintiff had
actual knowledge of facts giving rise to his claim. The Court further held that the knowledge ofthe claim
possessed by his attorney was imputed to him, and that the record showed that the attorney had such
knowledge outside of the limitations period. Mason, 125 Idaho at 433-34,871 P.2d at 85-51.
20 The federal district court found that the cause of action did not accrue until the fma1 RDA was
signed because "[i]t would be against basic contract principles to say just because one side has provided a
draft agreement, there are no further negotiations and the parties are fully aware of all terms."
Memorandum Order at 25 (Okt. 128, CR000961). With due respect to the federal court, the accrual of a
cause of action for inverse condemnation does not turn on principles of contract law. This Court has
repeatedly explained that the cause of action accrues when it becomes "apparent" that the government
intends to require something. That is a one-way communication. As White has acknowledged, there was
no doubt at the time of the CUP that substantial fees would be charged and that they would be based on the
County's CIP matrix. Notably, even White has not adopted or pursued the federal court's contract-based
line of reasoning in her briefing before this Court.
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v. City ofBoise ("BHA F').21 That is a question that could and should have been presented once it
became apparent that White would be required to pay a road fee. Indeed, the fact that no further
infonnation or quantification is required is evident in the fact that White herself sought declaratory
and injunctive relief regarding future fees for Phase II. In fact, White's claims as to the entire
project (which was covered by a single CUP) were ripe all along, and the clock has been running
since the CUP was issued.

IV.

WHITE CANNOT RE-START THE CLOCK BY RE-FRAMING THE RELIEF SOUGHT.

White makes key concessions that should simplifY the decision on this certified question.
She begins by correctly describing the County's argument, and then adds an important concession:
The County maintains that the accrual date should be the date the
CUP was granted because at that time it was 'apparent' White would
be required to pay some amount. Although White would have had a
legal injury at the time the CUP was granted, her legal injury at that
time would have only sustained a cause of action for whether the
conditioning of CUP approval on the payment of an impact fee was
legal or illegal.
Appellants' Brief at 9 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, White acknowledges, as she must, that she had a ripe cause of action at the time of
the CUP to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief as to "whether the conditioning of CUP approval
on the payment of an impact fee was legal or illegal." Appellants' Brief at 9. Yet she insists that
the clock runs separately on each coune2 and that she can avoid the statute oflimitations by

The purely legal nature of White's challenge is made clear in her complaint. For example, she
states: "Valley County's practice of requiring developers to enter into a Road Development Agreement (or
any similar written agreement) solely for the purpose of forcing developers to pay for money for its
proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a
disguised impact fee, is illegal and therefore the practice should be enjoined." Second Amended Complaint,
Dkt. 41,116 at p. 4, CR000021. There is no suggestion that the fees are not "proportionate" -which would
raise a Dolan issue.
21

22 "In this case, the answer to this certified question should be determined on the remedy being
sought by White." Appellants' Briefat 8.
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separately pleading a "claim for a refund based on her payment of the illegal impact fee [which is]
a separate injury and calls for a different remedy that did not accrue until the illegal tax was paid."
Appellants' Brief at 9.

Why would that be? White says it is because a cause of action seeking a refund of money
paid is not ripe until the money has been paid. Well, that is true-and rather obvious. But it is
quite a leap to get from that truism to the conclusion that White was free to wait until sometime
after she had paid the allegedly illegal fees and then re-frame the lawsuit as one for damages. By
analogy, a personal injury claim accrues (and the claim is ripe) when the plaintiff sustains some
damage, not when a medical bill is paid.
If White had filed in a timely fashion when it became apparent that a fee would be charged,
she might have obtained relief without ever having to pay the fee. For that matter, if she had
prevailed in a timely suit filed after fees had been paid, or if the fees were paid during the course
oflitigation, the County would have been obliged to return them.23 In any event, she did not need
to wait to ripen her claim. Her claim was always ripe all along, even if the nature of the relief
might change as events unfolded. White's contention that she is free to miss the deadline for
challenging the fee and that she is entitled to a second chance by re-framing the litigation as one
for damages is too obvious a ruse. It misses the whole point and policy of the statute of
limi tations. 24

23 As a practical matter, effective relief is available under a judicial review as well as a civil action.
While LLUPA does not provide for damages as such, a court hearing a matter on judicial review has the
power to declare the fee to be illegal. If that occurred, the entity imposing the fee would be obligated to
return the money illegally taken, and there are plenty of mechanisms to enforce that in the highly unlikely
event that the city or county required further prodding.
24 '''The policy behind statutes oflirnitations is protection of defendants against stale claims, and
protection of the courts against needless expenditures of resources.' Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397,
402, 700 P.2d 19,25 (1985). Statutes oflirnitation are designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty
with regards to future litigation." Wadsworth v. Idaho Dep '[ o/Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915
P.2d 1,4 (1996).
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This Court addressed much the same issue in Buckskin. There, the plaintiffs said they were
not bound to exhaust administrative remedies under the Local Land Use Planning Act
("LLUPA"), Idaho Code §§ 67-6501 to 67-6538, because doing so would not have provided the
relief sought. The Court made fast work of that argument:
Buckskin's claim that judicial review would not have
provided the relief it sought is also without merit. Had Buckskin
truly objected to the CUP condition, and had it successfully
challenged the condition and the validity of the CCA on judicial
review, it might have been able to avoid paying the road impact
charges for all six phases of The Meadows.

Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 493,300 P.3d at 25. The same should apply to White.
Actually, White said it well in her own brief. "Ripeness is a fundamental prerequisite to
invoke a Court's jurisdiction-a harm must be sufficiently matured to warrant judicial
intervention." Appellants' Briefat 9. The harm was sufficiently matured when the CUP was
issued. There was no need to know whether the fee would be for X dollars or Y dollars. Whether
the County had the authority to impose fees at all for this purpose is a question of law that could
have been determined at any time. White cannot restart the clock by tweaking the form of relief
requested to address events that might have been avoided by bringing a timely suit.
V.

THERE IS NO REASON TO DEPART FROM IDAHO LAW BASED ON DECISIONS OF
OTHER STATES.

A.

The foreign cases relied on by White are inapposite.

White asserts that her claim cannot accrue until "the impact fee is collected." Appellants'

Briefat 6, 10. That would be July 21, 2006, the date her agent wrote a check to pay the road fees.
Dkt. 1-3, CROOOOI5; Dkt. 96-2, CROOII12. White cites no authority on this from Idaho. Instead,
she urges the Court to jettison its own precedent and adopt a more favorable rule from other states.
However, the foreign case law she presents is inapposite.
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In Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County ofDuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001), the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld a decision finding the plaintiffs' class action barred by the five-year statute
oflimitations. The plaintiffs were payers of a road impact fee imposed by statute and ordinances
that were subsequently determined to be unconstitutional. 25 The illegal fees were collected by the
county more than five years prior to the commencement of the action but less than five years after
the decision that struck down the fees. The plaintiffs argued that their claims did not accrue until
the fees were declared to be unconstitutional. DuPage County argued that the claims accrued
when the fees were paid. The Illinois Supreme Court applied standards akin to Idaho's:
Courts of this state have held that a statute of limitation
begins to run when the party to be barred has the right to invoke the
aid of the court to enforce his remedy. Milnes v. Hunt, 311
Ill.App.3d 977, 980, 244 Ill. Dec. 306, 725 N.E.2d 779 (2000);
Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.App.3d 860, 869, 186 Ill. Dec. 807, 617
N.E.2d 46 (1993). Stated another way, a limitation period begins
"when facts exist which authorize one party to maintain an action
against another." Davis v. Munie, 235 Ill. 620, 622, 85 N.B. 943
(1908); Bank of Ravenswood v. City of Chicago, 307 Ill.App.3d 161,
167,240 Ill.Dec. 385, 717 N.E.2d 478 (1999).
Sundance, 746 N.E.2d at 260.

While acknowledging that an impact fee is not the same as a tax, the court found
instructive Illinois and federal cases holding that illegal tax claims accrue when the tax is paid
rather than when the plaintiff learns that the payment was erroneous. ld. at 260-61. Because the
fee payers could have challenged the legality of the impact fees at the time they paid them, the
court held that their causes of action accrued at that time regardless of the fact that the fees were
not declared to be unconstitutional until years later. !d. at 262.

25 The impact fees were struck down in a separate action in which the court held that the fees
collected should be returned. However, Sundance and the other class members were not parties to that
action.
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There are two reasons why Sundance is inapplicable here. The first is that the Sundance
court did not need to look back in time any further than the date of payment. Indeed, the county
itself argued that the accrual date was the date of payment. The question in Sundance was whether
the accrual of the actions was delayed until the fees were declared to be illegal. Here, there is no
argument by either party that the claims do not accrue until there is a decision on the merits.
Instead, the question is whether the claims accrued when the requirement to pay became apparent
due to condition 6 of the CUP or when the payment was actually made. That question was not
considered by the Sundance court. 26
The second difference between Sundance and the instant case is that the impact fees were
imposed by statute and ordinance rather than by the county's approval of an application, as is the
case here. In Sundance, as with typical tax refund cases, the obligation to pay the fees was not tied
to a CUP or other administrative or permitting decision. The applicable statute or ordinance
spelled out how much and when to pay. This is in contrast to the instant case in which White
made her payment in satisfaction of a requirement imposed when the CUP was issued.
This is the same reason that White's reliance on Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass 'n v. City of
La Habra, 23 P.3d 601 (Cal. 2001) is misplaced. In that case, the California Supreme Court held

that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based upon the city's continued

26 Venture Coal Sales Co. v. u.s., 370 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2004), Kuhn v. State, Dept. of Revenue,
897 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1995), and Bainbridge v. Riverside County, 334 P.2d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) also
stand for the unremarkable proposition that a subsequent court decision finding a statute or ordinance
unconstitutional does not create a new action or otherwise extend the limitations period. Indeed, this Court
said the same thing: "The phrase 'reasonably should have been discovered' refers to knowledge of the
facts upon which the claim is based, not knowledge of the applicable legal theory upon which a claim could
be based." BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BHA IF') (Eismann, J.), 141 Idaho 168, 174108 P.3d
315, 321 (2004) (Eismann, J.) (in context of notice required under tort claims act). See also, McCuskey II,
128 Idaho at 218,912 P.2d at 105, in which this Court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the statute of
limitations for temporary takings did not begin to run until the court declared that the zoning action was
unconstitutional.
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collection of an illegal general tax were not barred by the applicable statute oflimitations despite
being filed more than three years after the ordinance was enacted. The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs would have timely claims for refunds of the taxes collected (even though those claims
were not being pursued) within the three-year limitations period and therefore could also bring
declaratory and injunctive relief claims based on the continued collection of the taxes. Howard
Jarvis, 23 P.3d at 608-09. Again, as in Sundance, the claims in Howard Jarvis were not based

upon an obligation specifically imposed upon a particular plaintiff.
The Howard Jarvis court was careful to distinguish the decision in Ponderosa Homes, Inc.
v. City of San Ramon, 29 Cal.Rptr 2d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), in which a developer's claim for a

refund of a traffic mitigation fee was held to accrue on the date that the development was
conditionally approved rather than when the fee was paid. The Howard Jarvis court explained:
In Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (1994) 23
Cal.AppAth 1761, 1769-1771,29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 26, the appellate
court held that a city "imposed" a traffic mitigation fee on a
developer when the development was conditionally approved rather
than when the developer paid the fee. The decision is inapposite,
both because of the differing statutory context (the statute of
limitations there expressly ran from "imposition" [see id. at pp.
1768-1769,29 Cal.Rptr.2d 26] ) and because plaintiffs here
maintain that the City continues to impose the tax by requiring
service providers to collect it, not that plaintiffs' payment of taxes
constituted imposition by the City.
Howard Jarvis, 23 P .3d at 610. 27

In the instant case, as in Ponderosa Homes, the challenged fee was imposed when it was
made a condition of approval of the development. While the state statute that was applicable in
Ponderosa Homes played a part in the court's analysis, the same result obtains from the

27 One basis for the court's decision in Ponderosa Homes was that the applicable limitations statute
provided that the period ran from the "imposition" of the fee. However, as acknowledged by White, the
Ponderosa Homes court applied the same accrual date for the plaintiff's federal claims, which were not
subject to that statute.
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application of Idaho law concerning the accrual of actions. White was damaged and had a viable
cause of action the instant that the CUP was approved with the requirement to enter into an RDA.
The fact that White later made the required payment does not create a new action.
Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.1. 2000) involved a water connection fee

rather than a tax, but the analysis of accrual was the same as in Sundance and Howard Jarvis. The
Paul court first held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were untimely because they did not

comply with a state statute that required the filing of a challenge to a tax within three months of
the last day appointed for the payment of the tax without penalty. Paul, 745 A.2d at 171. As to
the plaintiffs' federal claims, brought under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, the court applied Rhode Island's
three-year statute oflimitations for personal injury actions. The court held that each plaintiff's
claim accrued on the date of the payment of the fee, which made all of the claims untimely. Paul,
745 A.2d at 172. Again, the court did not need to answer the question of whether the accrual
actually occurred earlier. Further, the fee became due and was paid at the same time-when the
property owner applied for a permit to connect to the water system. There was no prior regulatory
condition creating the obligation.
White claims support for her argument that the claim accrued when payment was made in
Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005), but the case is inapposite. In Lowenberg the

plaintiff mounted a class action challenge to an ordinance requiring all commercial property
owners to pay a "fire registration fee." Lowenberg, 168 S.W.3d at 800. The City contended that
the statute of limitations ran from the time of enactment of the ordinance. The Texas court said
that would be true if this had been a regulatory taking (because it was a facial challenge to an
ordinance). But in the Texas case there was no quid pro quo exaction. Indeed, it was not a
regulatory taking at all. Rather, the plaintiff challenged a fee imposed unilaterally on all
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commercial property owners. Thus, it was a physical taking, and a different rule applied. The
court ruled that in this type of physical taking, the taking occurs at the time payment is made.
Lowenberg, 168 S.W.3d at 802.

This case does nothing to advance White's cause. In the instant case, no statute or
ordinance is being facially challenged. Indeed, no statute or ordinance provides the basis for the
County's road fees. Moreover, unlike the fee imposed across-the-board on an entire class of
property owners in Lowenberg, the instant case involves a regulatory taking-a quid pro quo
exaction in which White was told that if she wants to get something (the right to develop her
property) she must give something (pay road fees). Accordingly, even the Texas precedent would
recognize that the key event is not the payment of the fee but the imposition of the obligation. In
White's case, she had a viable cause of action when it became clear that the fee would be required.
The actual payment does not create or add to the injury. White, by her own allegations, was
damaged when the obligation to contribute toward off-site road improvements was made a
condition of approval. That occurred on the date that the CUP was issued and White could have
sued even before payment was made. 28
In sum, the foreign cases relied on by White do not address the question presented here.
Three addressed whether the onset of the statute oflimitations is delayed until there is a judicial
determination that a impact fee is unlawful (Sundance Homes, Venture Coal, and Kuhn). Two
involved whether a cause of action for a facial challenge to unconstitutional ordinances accrues on

28 White cites one additional case in support of its proposition that the statute of limitations runs
from the date ofpayment-Wats Marketing ofAmerica, Inc. v. Boehm, 494 N.W.2d 527 (Neb. 1993).
While White accurately describes the result reached by the court in that case, White fails to mention that
the claims were subject to two state statutes that specifically provided that actions for the recovery of taxes
collected that are later deemed to be unconstitutional must be brought within one year of the final decision
declaring the tax to be unconstitutional and further provided for a refund of taxes paid for the year in which
the tax is determined to be illegal. Wats Marketing, 494 N.W.2d at 530-31. These somewhat peculiar
statutory provisions make Boehm wholly inapplicable and uninstructive.
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passage ofthe illegal ordinance (Sundance Homes and Howard Jarvis). Three involved traditional
taxes or service fees imposed on all comers, not regulatory takings imposed as conditions of
development (Howard Jarvis, Paul, and Lowenberg). Two involved situations in which the court
simply did not need to look back any further than the date the fee was paid, because that date was
outside the statute oflimitations (Sundance Homes and Paul).

B.

The other out-of-state cases cited by White support the County's
position.

The Ponderosa Homes decision, as discussed above, is supportive of the County's
position. There the court noted that "Ponderosa's subsequent payment of the fee in connection
with processing the phased final maps simply constituted the satisfaction of the condition already
imposed." Ponderosa Homes, 23 Cal.AppA th at 31. That sums it up nicely, and the same can be
said about White. Her injury arose not when she paid the fee, but when the obligation was
imposed in the CUP and CIP. Although the court in Ponderosa Homes was applying a specialized
limitations statute, its analysis of the accrual date applies broadly. Indeed, the court applied the
same analysis to the ordinary, one-year statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs' federal
claims. Ponderosa Homes, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d at 31-32.
In Fredrick v. Northern Palm Beach County Improvement Dist., 971 So.2d 974 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008), plaintiffs challenged assessments and impact fees for road improvements 14 years
after they were imposed. Plaintiffs said the statute oflimitations should not begin running until
they received notice of certain irregularities. Fredrick, 971 So.2d at 979. The Florida court
rejected this argument, noting prior rulings in which the Florida court "concluded that
municipalities need certainty in their economic affairs and that 'policy decisions should not be
subjected to perennial review. '" Id. at 980. The court concluded: "As a result, the approval and
creation of the assessments and impact fees here by the District provided sufficient notice to then
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existing and future homeowners of their obligations. This is true even if the assessments and
impact fees were improperly levied." Id. The same can be said here.
White goes on to suggest that adopting the rule from Fredrick and Ponderosa Homes
would be unfair to land use applicants because it would prevent them from challenging a fee if the
application was submitted four years after the assessment was adopted by the governmental entity,
and that cities and counties could circumvent IDIFA by collecting impact fees and hoping that
nobody challenged the fees within four years. Appellants' Briefat 13. White's alarmist response
is unfounded. This case involves a challenge to an allegedly illegal fee imposed as a condition of
approval on a land use application. Idaho law clearly provides the procedure for challenging such
a condition. There is nothing unfair about requiring a land use applicant to follow Idaho law by
raising objections in a timely fashion. There is no basis for the suggestion that future applicants
subjected to similar conditions would be barred from seeking relief.
VI.

IN ANY EVENT, THE APPLICABLE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IS THE 28-DAY PERIOD SET
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND/OR A REGULATORY TAKING ANALYSIS.

A.

The 28-day deadline overrides the four-year deadline.

White makes an interesting observation in her brief. In her effort to distinguish the case of
Ponderosa Homes, she noted that "the California law on this issue has been legislatively

preempted in this area." Appellants' Brief at 11-12. Although the California court did not use the
term preemption, White's characterization of the holding is conceptually correct. The California
court spoke in terms of determining which statutorily imposed time period is "the applicable
limitations period." Ponderosa Homes, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28.
Ponderosa Homes, by the way, bears striking similarity to the case at bar in that the

plaintiff challenged a traffic mitigation fee of$3,200 per residential lot imposed by the city as a
condition of development, contending that it was an "illegal special tax." Ponderosa Homes, 29
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Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27. The developer did not object, however, until the third phase ofthe project
when, like here, it suddenly dawned on him that the fee was illegal-thanks to a favorable result
obtained in another lawsuit by another developer. 29
The court found that the applicable limitations period was a I80-day deadline set for
bringing a legal challenge to a development exaction. Cal. Gov't 66020(d)(2).30 California has
other statutes oflimitation. For example, in Ponderosa Homes, California's one-year statute of
limitations governed the plaintiff's § 1983 action. However, the more specialized statutory
provision governing development approvals was the limitations period applicable to Ponderosa
Home's state law claims.
The same is true here. While White's federal claims are subject to the two-year statute of
limitations applicable to § 1983 claims, her state law claims are subject to the more specialized 28day limitations period set out in the judicial review provisions of LLUP A and/or the Idaho
Regulatory Taking Act, Idaho Code §§ 67-8001 to 67-8004. In other words, all the discussion
above about the trigger date for the four-year statute oflimitations is really academic. The
applicable limitations period is not four years, but 28 days.

29 As in Buckskin and Alpine Village, the case at bar is an after-the-fact, copycat lawsuit seeking to
ride the coattails of timely challenges to impact fees in Mountain Central Bd. ofRealtors, Inc. v. City of
McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19,2008) (Thomas F. Neville, J.)
(striking down McCall's affordable housing fee ordinance); Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. Blaine
Cnty, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., June 3,2008) (Robert J. Elgee, J.) (declaring
unlawful and unconstitutional various exaction and comprehensive plan ordinance provisions); and
Schaefer v. City ofSun Valley, Case No. CV -06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007) (Robert J.
Elgee, J.) (striking down Sun Valley's affordable housing fee ordinance).

30 The California statute appears to have been amended slightly subsequent to the decision in
Ponderosa Homes, but this is of no consequence to the discussion here.
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Since 1975, LLUPA has authorized judicial review of certain permitting decisionsincluding CUPs and final plats-identified in Idaho Code §§ 67-6519(4) and 67-6521(1).31
LLUP A, in tum, references and relies on the judicial review provisions of the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act, Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).
Alternatively, White could have hit the pause button on the judicial review by seeking a
regulatory taking analysis under Idaho Code § 67-6512(a) (a LLUPA provision that keys into the
section 67-8003(2) of the Idaho Regulatory Taking Act. That deadline, however, is also 28 days.
Instead of appealing or requesting a regulatory taking analysis, White signed the RDA and
proceeded with her development. She thus passed on both opportunities provided by the
Legislature to challenge the road fees. As this Court ruled in Buckskin (on facts very similar to
these), LLUP A's judicial review provisions are exclusive. 32 "As the County points out, Buckskin
failed to seek judicial review of the requirement in its CUP that the CCA [equivalent of the RDA
here] received the County Board's approval. If Buckskin truly was aggrieved by this requirement,
it had the ability to seek judicial review. By failing to do so, it cannot now complain." Buckskin,
154 Idaho at 493,300 P.3d at 25.
This follows directly the precedent set in Bone v. City ofLewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 847-48,
693 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (1984) (Bistline, J.) (civil action challenging re-zone was an improper end
run around judicial review); Curtis v. City ofKetchum, 111 Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 210 (1986)

Neither the 2010 amendment to LLUP A, 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175, nor the Court's
decision in Giltner Dairy v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633, 181 P.3d 1238, 1241 (2008) and its
progeny changed the availability of judicial review for CUPs and final plats. Both were reviewable before
and remain reviewable today under LLUP A.
31

32 There are limited exceptions to the exclusivity rule, none of which is applicable here, just as they
were not applicable in Buckskin. For example, in McCuskey v. Canyon Cnty ("McCuskey f'), 123 Idaho
657,660,851 P.2d 953,956 (1993) (Bistline, J.). the Court held that a party may bypass judicial review
where it brings a facial challenge to an ordinance. Here, there was no ordinance mandating or directing the
CIP or RDA process. The CIP and each RDA were adopted and applied on an ad hoc basis without any
basis in ordinance.
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(Bakes, J.) (denial of subdivision should have been challenged by judicial review, not civil action);
and Regan v. Kootenai Cnty, 140 Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 615,619 (2004) (Schroeder, J.)
(plaintiff should have brought a LLUP A appeal rather than seeking declaratory action to address
the county's interpretation of a zoning ordinance). 33
Courts in other jurisdictions have followed the same approach. In Sold, Inc. v. Town of
Gorham, 868 A.2d 172 (Maine 2005), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered a

declaratory judgment action brought by a group of developers who had paid impact fees under an
allegedly illegal ordinance (alleging an unconstitutional taking among other things). The court
held that the action was barred by the plaintiffs' failure to challenge the city's approval oftheir
subdivisions, which included the payment of the impact fees as a condition, within 30 days as
provided under state law. "When the time to file an appeal expired, the conditional approvals,
including the impact fee requirements, became final, and were not subject to challenge." Sold Inc.
at 176 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in James v. Cnty ofKitsap, 115 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2005), the Washington
Supreme Court addressed claims from developers who sought refunds of impact fees paid during
the time that the county's ordinances were not in compliance with state law. In James, the county
appealed from a summary judgment that awarded the developers more than three million dollars in
refunds arguing, inter alia, that the developers' claims were barred by their failure to challenge the
fees within 21 days of when the permits were issued, as required under Washington's Land Use
Petition Act ("LUP A"). The James court agreed with the county. "[W]e find that the imposition

33 The exclusivity of judicial review is not unique to LLUP A. In Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143
Idaho 130, 133-34, 139 P.3d 732, 735-36 (2006) (J. Jones, J.), this Court held that a petition for judicial
review pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-208 (the public road statute) is the exclusive means to challenge a
county's decision concerning the validation of a road. Citing Bone, the Court reiterated that, when
provided, statutory judicial review proceedings are exclusive remedies.
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of impact fees as a condition on the issuance of a building permit is a land use decision and is not
reviewable unless a party timely challenges that decision within 21 days of its issuance." James at
292. The court's reasoning is equally applicable here:
The Developers here were provided, by statute, with several
avenues to challenge the legality of the impact fees imposed by the
County and comply with the procedural requirements under chapter
82.02 RCW and LUP A .... However, rather than complying with
either of these procedures provided by statute, the Developers
waited almost three years before challenging the legality of the
impact fees imposed by the County. The Developers have not
complied with the procedures provided under LUP A and RCW
82.02.070(4) and are barred under LUPA from challenging the
legality of the fees imposed.
James at 293-94. What the court said about the policy underlying the requirement resonates here:
[T]his court has long recognized the strong public policy evidenced
in LUPA, supporting administrative finality in land use decisions.
146 Wash.2d at 931-32,52 P.3d 1. The purpose and policy of the
law in establishing definite time limits is to allow property owners to
proceed with assurance in developing their property. Additionally,
and particularly with respect to impact fees, the purpose and policy
of chapter 82.02 RCW in correlation with the procedural
requirements of LUP A ensure that local jurisdictions have timely
notice of potential impact fee challenges. Without notice of these
challenges, local jurisdictions would be less able to plan and fund
construction of necessary public facilities. Absent enforcement of
the requirements under chapter 82.02 RCW and LUP A, local
jurisdictions would alternatively be faced with delaying necessary
capacity improvements until the three-year statute oflimitations for
challenging impact fees had run.
James at 294.
Obviously, these out-of-state cases applied their own statutes. They are of interest here
only to the extent the Court finds their reasoning compelling. The County offers them, however,
because it believes their reasoning is compelling and entirely consistent with this Court's
treatment of the subject.
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B.

The exception to the exhaustion requirement under Idaho Code
§ 67-6521(2)(b) has no application here.

In Buckskin, the Court said that the plaintiffs failure to seek timely judicial review was not
the end of the story because there was the possibility that the plaintiffs "may also have had the
ability to assert an inverse condemnation claim." Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 494,300 P.3d at 26. It
was possible, the Court explained (without deciding) that the plaintiffs' inverse condemnation
claim might be exempt from exhaustion requirements (and thus not subject to the 28-day deadline)
due to an exception provided for inverse condemnation claims in Idaho Code § 67-6521(2)(b).
As the Buckskin Court noted, the section 67-6521 (2)(b) exception was not raised by the
plaintiff. Nor has White raised it here. The County, however, addresses it in order to put the issue
to rest.
In short, the provision is not applicable to White's claim and provides no protection to
White from the 28-day rule. This is a very narrow exception that applies only to challenges based
on the allegation that an alleged taking is not for a public purpose. This Court has noted before
that this provision does not apply to all regulatory takings actions. "It only applies if the basis of
the inverse condemnation claim is that a specific zoning action or permitting action restricting
private property development is actually a regulatory action by local government deemed
necessary to complete the development of the material resources of the state, or necessary for
other public uses." KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56,62 (2003)
(Eismann, J.) (internal quotations omitted).
The statute reads:
(2)(a) Authority to exercise the regulatory power of zoning
in land use planning shall not simultaneously displace coexisting
eminent domain authority granted under section 14, article I, of the
constitution ofthe state ofIdaho and chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code.
(b) An affected person claiming "just compensation" for a
perceived "taking," the basis ofthe claim being that a final action
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restricting private property development is actually a regulatory
action by local government deemed "necessary to complete the
development of the material resources of the state," or necessary for
other public uses, may seek a judicial determination of whether the
claim comes within defined provisions of section 14, article I, of the
constitution of the state ofIdaho relating to eminent domain. Under
these circumstances, the affected person is exempt from the
provisions of subsection (1) of this section and may seek judicial
review through an inverse condemnation action specifying neglect
by local government to provide "just compensation" under the
provisions of section 14, article I, of the constitution of the state of
Idaho and chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code [dealing with eminent
domain].
Idaho Code § 67-6521(2) (as amended in 2010).34
The effect of the statute is to exempt from the judicial review provisions a party who
alleges a taking and seeks a "determination of whether the claim comes within the defined
provisions of section 14, article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho relating to eminent
domain." The referenced constitutional provision authorizes governmental entities and even
private parties to condemn the property of others for any "use necessary to the complete
development of the material resources of the state," which uses are "declared to be a public use."
This sweeping power-which may be exercised by one private person against the property of
another-has been recognized since 1906. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P.
426 (1906); Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, 155 P. 680 (1916), appeal
dismissed, 244 U.S. 651. Constitutional provisions like this, allowing private property to be taken
for other seemingly private uses (such as private development touted as urban renewal), have
become increasingly controversial across the nation in the last few decades, culminating in the
celebrated case of Kelo v. City a/New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The Idaho statute, which

34 The provision was added in 1996, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 199, and amended slightly in 2010,
2010 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175. The 2010 amendment was not substantive. It simply conformed the
language to changes made elsewhere in LLUPA dealing with judicial review.
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pre-dates Kelo, was enacted at a time of growing public alarm over what is perceived by many as
use of eminent domain to promote private, rather than public, purposes.
The language of the statute is somewhat difficult to parse, and its purpose and effect are
not intuitively apparent. Accordingly, resort to legislative history is appropriate and helpful. The
complete legislative history is reproduced in Addendum A to this brief.
Thankfully, the legislative history is much clearer than the statute itself in showing that the
measure is aimed at and limited to challenges based on the allegation that a governmental taking is
not for a valid public purpose. The sponsor ofthe measure, Rep. Jim D. Kempton, provided
testimony on the measure to the House State Affairs Committee on January 30, 1996. His
testimony on House Bill 628 was summarized in the record as follows, "This proposed legislation
amends local government land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies
need not be exhausted prior to judicial review if a taking claim involves court determination of
public use under provisions of eminent domain." (Emphasis supplied.) Virtually identical
statements were made by Rep. Kempton before the same committee on February 13, 1996, and on
March 1, 1996 to the Senate Local Government and Taxation Committee. This language also
corresponds, word for word, to the official statement of purpose for the bill (H.B. 628). At the
March 1, 1996 hearing, Rep. Kempton also handed out a packet of information including a copy of
Idaho Const., art. I, § 14, with the relevant language underlined, as well as an exchange of
correspondence with the Office of the Idaho Attorney General discussing this constitutional
language. Thus the legislative history is consistent with the language of the statute itself which
limits the new exhaustion exception to those rare situations in which a landowner contends that a
regulatory action is not for a legitimate "public use." This conclusion is further reinforced by the
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agenda heading for the hearing on March 1, 1996, which said that the bill "[p ]rovides remedy for
zoning action was in essence an eminent domain action."
Plainly, then, the scope of the legislation is quite narrow. It applies to an "affected person"
who asserts that his or her property is being taken for something other than a public purpose. This
would include, for example, the property owner who is the target of an eminent domain
proceeding facilitating a private development. Presumably, it would also include a neighboring
property owner affected by a new development facilitated through eminent domain. But that is all
it does. It does not provide a blanket exemption from the exclusive judicial review provisions of
LLUP A for anyone alleging a regulatory taking in the context of their own development.
The fact that a similar exemption was not included in LLUP A's other judicial review
provision, Idaho Code § 67-6519(4)-which applies to the permit applicant-reinforces the idea
that this measure is intended to protect those on the receiving end of eminent domain
proceedings-people like Susette Kelo whose home was demolished to make way for Pfizer-not
to protect the developers themselves by providing an end-run around LLUP A. Indeed, the absence
of a corresponding exemption from section 67 -6519(4) presents at least an argument that
"applicants" for permits under section 67 -6519( 4) are not covered, and that the exemption applies
only to other "affected persons" under section 67-6521(2).
The bottom line is that the controlling time limitation on White's case is not four years, but
28 days. And White's case does not fall within the exception in section 67-6521(2) applicable to
challenges based on a condemnation not being for a proper public use.
CONCLUSION

In Buckskin, the Court outlined the statute of limitations issue at some length, even quoting
from the district court's decision. Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 495,300 P.3d at 26. Ultimately,
however, the Court found it unnecessary to address the question, because payment of the very
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same road fee requirement was found to be voluntary. Buckskin, 154 Idaho at 495-97, 300 P.3d at
26-28. The certified question presented here provides an opportunity for the Court to squarely
address this issue.
For the reasons discussed above, the County urges the Court to rule that when an applicant
for a development permit challenges a condition or requirement that property be conveyed or fees
be paid to the government and the challenge is not based on the amount of the property conveyed
or fee charged, the claim accrues when it becomes apparent that the applicant will be required to
make a conveyance or payment as a condition of that development.
The County further urges the Court to clarify that the catch-all four-year statute of
limitations may be supplanted and replaced by another more specific and individualized deadline
for initiating litigation established by the Legislature. This would include the 28-day deadline for
seeking judicial review under LLUP A and/or a taking analysis under the Idaho Regulatory Taking
Act.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of August, 2013.
GIVENS PURSLEY

LLP
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ADDENDUM A:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IDAHO CODE § 67-6521(2)(B)

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Fifty-third Legislature

Second Regular Session - 1996

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE BILL NO. 628
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

1
2
3
4

AN ACT
RELATING TO PLANNING AND ZONING; AMENDING SECTION 67-6521, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE REMEDIES FOR AN AFFECTED PERSON WHO CLAIMS THAT A ZONING ACTION OR
PERMITTING ACTION WAS IN ESSENCE AN EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION.

5

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

6
7

SECTION 1. That Section 67-6521, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41
42
43
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67-6521.

ACTIONS BY AFFECTED PERSONS.
(1) (a) As used herein, an affected person shall mean one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or
denial of a permit authorizing the development.
(b) Any affected person may at any time prior to final action on a permit
required or authorized under this chapter, if no hearing has been held on
the application, petition the commission or governing board in writing to
hold a hearing pursuant to section 67-6512, Idaho Code; provided, how~yer,
that if twenty (20) affected persons petition for a hearing, the hearing
shall be held.
(c) After a hearing, the commission or governing board may:
(ii) Grant Or deny a permit; or
(~Ii) Delay such a decision for a definite period of time for further
study or hearing. Each commission or governing board shall establish
by rule and regulation a time period within which a recommendation or
decision must be made.
(d) An affected person aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight
(28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances
seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
(2) (a) Authority to exercise the regulatory power of zoning in land use
planning shall not simultaneously displace coexisting eminent domain
authority granted under section 14, article If of the constitution of the
state of Idaho and chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code.
(b) An affected person claiming "just compensation" for a perceived
"taking," the basis of the claim being that a specific zoning action or
permitting action restricting private property development is actually a
regulatory action by local government deemed "necessary to complete the
development of the material resources of the state," or necessary for
other public uses, may seek a judicial determination of whether the claim
comes within defined provisions of section 14. article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho relating to eminent domain. Under these circumstances, the affected person is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and may seek judicial review through an inverse
condemnation action specifying neglect by local government to provide
If just compensation" under the provisions of section 14, article I, of
the
constitution of the state of Idaho and chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code.
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Minutes

HOUSE STATE AFFAIRS
DATE: JANUARY 30, 1996
TIME: 9:00 A.M.
PLACE: Room 412
PRESENT:

ABSENT:

Chairman Crane, Vice Chairman Deal, Representatives Stone, Tippets, Wood,
Sutton, King, Alltus, Dorr, Erhart, Hornbeck, Kjellander, Field, Gines, Vandenberg,
Stoicheff, Alexander and Judd.
Representatives Newcomb and Loertscher were absent.

MOTION:

Chairman Crane called the meeting to order at 9:03 A.M. Representative King
moved that the minutes of January 29, 1996 be approved. The motion was seconded
by Representative Dorr. Motion Passed.

RS05744

Representative Stoicheff presented RS05744. The purpose of this Legislation is to
allow people who do not live within a fire district but do own property within a fire district
and who are Idaho residents to vote in all fire districts elections.

MOTION:

Representative Vandenberg made a motion that RS05744 be introduced for printing.
Representative Stone seconded the motion. Motion passed.

RS05248C1

Representative Alltus presented RS05248C1. The purpose of this legislation is to stop
public funds from going to lobbying.

MOTION:

Representative Erhart made a motion that RS05248C1 be returned to sponsor.
Representative Stone seconded the motion.

SUBSTITUTE Representative Dorr made a substitute motion that RS05248C1 be introduced for
MOTION:
printing. Representative Gines seconded the motion. The motion passed. Counting
vote of 12 Ayes.
RS05332C2

MOTION:

Representative Hornbeck made a motion that RS05332C2 be introduced for printing.
Representative Stone seconded the motion. The motion passed.

RS05507

Representative Crow presented RS05507. The purpose of this legislation is to repeal
the Idaho Code Which allows dog racing. It would further amend the Idaho Code to
eliminate dog racing from the definition of a race meet and to eliminate references to
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Mr. Freeman Duncan from the Attorney General's Office, presented RS05332C2. The
purpose of this legislation is to address the statewide problems associated with the
recording of vexatious common law liens against state and local officials. The legislation
deals with non-statutory lien claims that are not court-imposed, are not consented to by
the owner of the property being liened, and are premised upon the alleged performance
or nonperformance of an official's duties. The legislation provides for an expedited
court procedure for chanenge of the lien, and for the ability of the property owner to
recover a civil penalty of $5,000.00 or actual damages, which ever is greater, if the claim
is found by a court to be groundless or false. Mr. Bill Von Tagen, from the Attorney
. General's office, answered questions raised by the committee conceming RS05332C2.

10915·11

Page A-3

training dogs tt-lce by the use of live lures.

MOTION:

Representative Wood made a motion that RS05507 be introduced for printing.
Representative Dorr seconded the motion. The motion passed.

RS05533C1

Representative Kempton presented RS05533C1. This proposed legislation amends
local government land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies
need not be exhausted prior to judicial review if a taking claim involves court
determination of public use under provisions of eminent domain. Representative
Kempton brought to the attention of the committee that a typo error needed to be
corrected on line 32. ","taking" should read "taking".....

MOTION:

Vice Chairman Deal made a motion that RS05533C1 be introduced for printing with
the typo error corrected. Representative Gines seconded the motion The motion
passed. Legislative services indicated that the RS05533C1 was correct as typed.
Representative Kempton will let Chairman Crane know that the RS was printed as first
read.

H 419

Mr. Dwight Johnson from the Department of Employment, presented H 419.
This bill contains three amendments to Idaho's Employment Security Law. Currently,
one criteria for determining wether an employer is covered by the Employment Security
Law is whether the employer paid three hundred dollars ($300) in covered wages in a
calendar quarter. H 419 increased the amount covered to fifteen hundred dollars
($1500). The second amendment would allow the Governor to consolidate the
Employment Service Advisory Council with similarly focused advisory bodies to
eliminate overlapping advisory bodies and their attendant costs. The third amendment
allows individuals filing a new daim for unemployment insurance benefits to voluntarily
elect to have federal income tax withheld from their benefits checks.

MOTION:

Representative Erhart made a motion'that H 419 be sent to the floor with a DO PASS.
Representative Wood seconded the motion. The motion passed. Vice Chairman Deal
will Sponsor the bill on the floor.
Meeting adjourned at 10:08 A.M. Next meeting will be Wednesday, January 31, 1996 at
9:30A.M.

RON G. CRANE, CHAIRMAN

C'+'~~

JUDITH CHRISTENSEN, SECRETARY

-

{COMMITTEE NAME HERE)
[Day and Date of Meeting]-Agenda-Page 2
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Minutes

HOUSE STATE AFFAIRS
DATE: February 13, 1996
TIME: 8:30 A.M.
PLACE: Room 412

PRESENT:

Chairman Crane, Vice Chairman Deal, Representatives Stone, Wood, Erhart,
Sutton. King, Alltus, Dorr, Hornbeck, Kjellander, Field, Newcomb,
Stoicheff, Judd, Tippets, Vandenberg, Alexander and Gines.

ABSENT:

Representative Loertscher

MOTION:

Chairman Crane called the meeting to order at 8:40 A.M. Representative King
moved that the minutes of February "12. 1996 be approved. The motion was seconded
by Representative Alltus. Motion Passed.

RS05876

Representative Gines presented RS05876. This Joint House Memorial deems it to be a
violation of the rights of those who serve in our nation's military and the rights of the
American people who pay for our nation's military to transfer the United States armed
forces to the United Nations or any other foreign command.

MOTION:

Representative King made a motion that RS05876 be introduced for printing.
Representative Dorr seconded the motion. Motion passed.

H 628

Representative Kempton presented H 628. This proposed legislation amends local
government land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies need
not be exhausted prior to judicial review if a taking claim involves court determination of
public use under provisions of eminent domain.

MOTION:

Vice Chairman Deal made a motion that H 628 be sent to the floor with a DO PASS.
Representative Stone seconded the motion. Motion passed.

H 654

Mr. Michael Sheeley from the Department of Administration presented H 654. To
amend existing central postal system statutes to allow statehouse mail delivery to all
state office buildings located within the boundaries of Ada County.
Testimony in favor of H 654 was given by Me Jake Hofhman from the Department of
Administration.
Testimony opposed to H 654 was given by Mr. Ed Johnson from Auto Sort. Mr. David
Eichmann, manager of BSU mail services and Ms. Linda-Diane Hill from Pitney Bowes
Company.
H 654 was assigned to a sub-committee chaired by Vice Chairman Deal.
Representatives Hornbeck, Field, DOfr and Vandenberg will serve on the committee.
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H 657

Mr. Michael Shet:;!ey presented H 657. This legislation al..!.orized the Administration of
the Division of Purchasing to acquire information technology property by means of the
award of a contract to multiple bidders.
Testimony in support of H 657 was given by Mr. Gary Silvester from the Department of
Administration and Ms. Elinor Cheney, accountant for the Commission on Aging.

MOTION:

Representative Alltus made a motion to send H 657 to the floor with a DO PASS. Vice
Chairman Deal seconded the motion. Motion passed. Representative Stoicheff
recorded as a nay vote. Representative King will carry the bill.

H 661

Ms. Pam Ahrens, Director of the Department of Administration presented H 661. This
legislation repeals the existing statute regarding the Advisory Council on Information
Technology and creates the Information Technology Resource Management Council.
Testimony supporting H 661 was given by Mr. Gene Watkins.

MOTION:

Representative Kjellander made a motion that H 661 be sent to the floor with a DO
PASS. Representatives Field, Hornbeck, and Alexander seconded the motion. Motion
passed. Representatives Kjellander and Alexander will carry the bill to the floor.

H676

Representative Newcomb presented H 676. The purpose of this legislation is to require
the state Historic preservation officer be appointed by the Governor.
Testimony supporting H 676 was given by Mr. Weldon Branch representing ICA and
Mr. Frank Land representing ICA.

MOTION:

Representative Sutton made a motion that H 676 be sent to the floor with a DO PASS.
Representatives Wood, Stone, Hornbeck and Kjellander seconded the motion. Motion
passed. Representative Newcomb will carry the bill to the floor.

Meeting adjourned at 10:10 A.M. Next meeting for the State Affairs Committee will be
Wednesday, February 14, 1996, at 9:00 A.M.

RON G. CRANE, CHAIRMAN

JUDITH CHRISTENSEN, SECRETARY

HOUSE STATE AFFAIRS
Tuesday, February 13, 1996 Agenda page 2
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AGENDA

SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT & TAXATION COMMITTEE
3:00 P.M.
ROOM 426
FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 1996

[

I
I

BILL NO.

DESCRIPTION

SPONSOR

H 765

Sales tax seller's permits

Tax Commission

H686

Income tax grocery credit, must be Idaho resident

Rep. Wood

H628

Provides remedy for a zoning action which was in
essence an eminent domain action

Rep. Kempton

H672

Transportation analysis, local jurisdiction

Association of
Cities

H 741

Firefighter labor relations with political subdivisions

Ken McClure

H 757aa

Budget limit exemption for five years/capital improvement Cities
projects

H809

Income tax shareholder/corporate credits for payment
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Minutes

SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT & TAXATION COMMITTEE
DATE:

March 1, 1995-

TIME:

3:00 p.m.

PLACE:

Room 426

PRESENT:

Chairman Thorne, Senators Hawkins, Parry, Furness, Frasure, Ipsen. Wheeler, Tucker
and Stennett

ABSENTI
EXCUSED:

None

Chairman Thorne called the meeting to order at 3:07 p.m. Senator Furness moved approval of
the minutes for February 23, 1996. Senator Parry seconded the motion. By unanimous voice vote
the motion passed. Senator Tucker moved approval oJ the minutes for February 28, 1996.
Senator Wheeler seconded the motion. By unanimous voice vote the motion passed. Senator
Frasure moved approval of the minutes for February 26, 1996. Senator Tucker seconded the
motion. By unanimous voice vote the motion passed. A silent roll call was taken.
H 765

Ted Spangler, Idaho State Tax Commission, presented House Bill 765. 'This legislation makes
cbanges to the Idaho Sales Tax Act relating to seller's permits. Presently, seller's permits are
indefinite. Many of these sellers are no longer in business. With this legislation, seller's permits
will automatically expire after a period of twelve consecutive months of no sales.reported. Nonprofit organizations that have only one large sale per year can apply for a one time sale report.

MOTION

Senator Ipsen moved to send House Bill 765 to tbe floor wjth a "do pass" recommendation.
Senator Frasure seconded the motion.

VOTE

By unanimous voice vote the mot jon passed. Senator. Ipsen will carry the bill.

H 686

Representative Wood explained House Bill 686. 'This legislation is an effort to stop the practice
of persons claiming a grocery credit on their taxes when filing for dependents not domiciled in this
State. Enforcement would be up to tax preparers.

MOTION

Senator Ipsen moved that House BilI6B6 be sent to the floor wjth a "do pass" recommendatioo.
Senator Parry seconded the motion.

SUBSTITUTE
MOTION
Senator Tucker moved to hold House Bill 686 in committee. Senator Frasure seconded the
motion.

ROLLCALL
VOTE
By a roll call vote of 3-6 the substitute motion failed, with Senators Hawkins, Frasure and Tucker
voting aye; and Senators Thorne, Parry, Furness, Ipsen, Wheeler, and Stennett voting nay.
ROLLCALL
VOTE
Bya roll call vote of 6-3 the ori~naJ motion passed, with Senators Thorne, Parry, Furness, Ipsen,
Wheeler, and Stennett voting aye; and Senators Hawkins, Frasure and Tucker voting nay. Senator
Thorne will sponsor the bill.
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H628

Representative Kempton distributed a handout and explained House Bi!l628. This legislation
amends local government land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies need
not be exhausted prior to judicial review if a talcing claim involves court determination of public
use under provisions of eminent domain.

MOTION

Senator Stennett moved to hold House Bill 628 in committee. There was no second.

MOTION

Senator Frasure moved to send House Bill 628 to the full Senate with a "do pass"
recommendation. Senator Wheeler seconded the motion.
Senator Stennett felt this would create more crowding in the courts. Senator Hawkins felt this may
increase local discussion and lighten the load on the courts.

ROLLCALL

VOTE

By a roll call vote of 8-1 the motion passed, with Senators Thorne, Hawlcins. Parry, Furness,
Frasure, Ipsen, Wheeler, and Tucker voting aye; and Senator Stennett voting nay. Senator
Hawkins will sponsor the bill.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT
REQUEST
Chainnan Thorne requested unanimous consent to hold House Bill 809 until Monday, given that two
of the committee members needed to be excused momentarily, and the sponsor desired to have all
members present for the hearing on House Bill 809. There were no objections.

H672

Scott McDonald, Association of Idaho Cities, explained House Bill 672. This legislation requlres
the cities and counties to prepare the comprehensive plans in coordination with whoever has
jurisdiction over the local highway system.

MOTION

Senator Wheeler moved to send House Bill 672 to the floor wjth a "do pass" recommendation.
Senator Frasure seconded the motion.

VOTE

By unanimous voice vote the motion ~. Senator Wheeler will carry the bilI.

H741

Ken McClure, representing the City of Boise,explained House Bill 741. Idaho Code currently
requires government entities to negotiate fire fighter contracts through a quorum of the city council
and mayor, or county commission, or fire district board. This legislation would allow the
government entity to designate a person with authority to bargain on its behalf.

MOTION

Senator Furness moved to send House Bill 741 to the floor with a "do pass· recommendation.
Senator Stennett seconded the motion.

VOTE

By unanimous voice vote the motion passed. Senator Furness will carry the bill.

H757a

Scott McDonald presented House Bill 757 as amended to the committee. This legislation will
extend from 2 years to 5 years for capital improvements as an exemption from the budget
limitations of taxing districts. He suggested a new amendment to replace two and add the word
"or" to make the new language read "two or five years"

MOTION

Senator Hawkins moved to hold House BW 757a in committee. Senator Furness seconded the
motion.
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SUBSTITUTE
MOTION
Senator Wheeler made a substitute motion to send House 8m 757a to the 14th order for
amendment. Senator Stennett seconded the motion.

VOTE

By majority voice vote the substitute motion failed.

VOTE

By majority voice vote the oriejnaJ motion passed. House Bill 757 as amended will be held in
committee.
Meeting adjourned at 4:28 p.m.
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CONSTITUTI ON Of THE
in the manner pres c ribed by law .

13 .

GUARANTIES

IN

CRIMINAL

ACTIONS

AND DUE PROCESS Of LAW . In all criminal prosecutions, the

ed shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel
ce of witnesses in his behalf . and to appear and defend i n person and wi th counsel.
shall be twi c e put in jeopardy for t.he same offense; no[' be compelled in any criminal c as e to be
himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
'RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN . The necessary use of lands for the construction of reser voirs or
basins, for the purpo s e of irrigat ion, or for rights of way for the construction of canals, ditche s ,
or pipes, to convey water to the place of use for any useful, beneficial or necessary purpos e , or for
or for the drainage of mines, or the ~orking thereof, by means of roads, railroads, tramway s , cuts,
shafts, hoisting woeks, dumps, or other necessary means to their complete development, or any other
to the
Ieee devel
of the material
the preserva t ion of the
regulation and control of
be taken for public us e. but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the

shall be paid therefor.
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT PROHIBITED. There shall be no
of frau d.
BILLS Of ATTAINDER,
17.

imprisonment

for

debt

in

th is

state

I

f
.~

,

1f
I.

PROHIBITED. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairbe passed.

).

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PROHIBITED. The right of the people to be secure in their
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
issue ~ithout probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be
person or thing to be seized.

JUSTICE TO BE fREELY AND SPEEDILY ADMINISTERED. Courts of justice

shall

be

open

to

every

and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.

RIGHT OF SUFfRAGE GUARANTIED. No power, civil or military, shall at any time

interfere

with

1

,

I '.

exercise of the right of suffrage .

20.

NO

PROPERTY

QUALIfICATION

REQUIRED

Of ELECTORS -- EXCEPTIONS . No property qualifications

be required for any person to vote or hold office except in school elections, or elections creating
~ t.eane$S, or in irrigation district elections, as
to which last-named elections the legislature may
voters to land owners .
21.
RESERVED RIGHTS NOT IMPAIRED. This enwneration of rights sball not be construed to impair or
other rights retained by the people.

.
,

I

I

ARTICLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
SECTION 1.

DEPARTMENTS Of GOVERNMENT. Th e powers of the government of this state are divided

into

three

tinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged
1 the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any po~ers
properly
)nging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

ARTICLE III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1.

LEGISLATIVE POWER -- ENACTING CLAUSE -- REFERENDUM -- INITIATIVE . The legislative power of the

te shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives. The enacting clause of every hili shall b~ a s
10,",s: "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho. H
The people reserve to themselves the power to approve or reject at the polls any act · or measure passed by
legislature. This power is known as the referendum, and legal voters may, under such conditions and in
h manner as may be provided by acts of the legislatUre, demand a referendum vote on any act or measure
sed by the legislature and cause the same to be submitted LO a vote of the .people . lor their approval or
ection .
The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws t and enact the same at the polls independ'ent of
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COMMITfEES

.~

REVENUE & TAXATION

.>OKA.
,'OUNTIES

TRANSPORTATION & DEFENSE
~ AOORESS

JUDICIARY, RULES & ADMINISTRATION

35. SOX 28
..oN. IDAHO 8331 t
12081 673·626 t
J

HOllse of Representatives
State of Idaho
January 15, 1996
TO:

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION;
in Land Use Planning.

Eminent

Domain

Relevance

Eminent domain provis i ons of Article 1, se c ti on 14, of the Idaho
Constitut i on are rath e r uniq u e in that eminent domain relevance
in questions o f "takings" is established, in part, on the basis
of actions by state or local government that are deemed
"necessary to the complete development of the material resources
of the state".
Blackwell Lumbe r Co. v. Engine Mill Co., a 1916 case before
the Idaho Supreme Court, defines in considerabl e detail the
court's authority to determine uses "necessary to the complete
development of the material r e sources of the state" i thereby
suggesting that jn today's l a nd Ilse reglllatory envjronment
eminent domain rel~ce should remain a statutory consideration
in an "affecbHl perg9l'l' g" Fight to access judicial rIO"; e u'
If so, an "affected person's" access to the courts need not;.
always involve exhaustion of administrative remedies under
67 6521 (dl, Idaho Cnde.
An Attorney General's opinion is therefore requested related
to the attached "RS"i specifically, in the limited context
presented, is the proposed language correct in regard to ao_
~ 'affected
person"s " right to access . udicial
a correspon ~ng nee to exhaust administrative remed i ~?
Thank you in advance for your assistance

/)~~~

~D.

Kempto
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STATE OF IDAHO
ALAN G. LANCE
ATIOR."'IEY GENERAL

OFFICE Of THE AITORNEY GENERAL
Statehouse, Room 210
P.O. Box 83720

BOISE 83720-0010

Telept1()ne (2OB) 334-2.;00

F.1.I:: (2081334-2530

Criminal Law Olvl.siQn

January 24, 1996

F8){; (200) 334-2942

Naturul Resources OiYisxm

F&Jc.: t208I3J.4-2690

Honorable Jim D. Kempton
Idaho House of Representatives
Statehouse
Boise, Idaho 83720
Dear Representative Kempton:
Per our discussion, I have reviewed your proposed legislation allowing certain
individuals aggrieved by a planning and zoning decision of a governmental body to
proceed directly to court, rather than exhaust administrative remedies if they allege a
"taking" under the Idaho Constitution.
From your earlier draft which we reviewed., you have proposed adding language to
the effect that the citation on lines 34-35 to the constitutional defInition of a public use,
i.e., "necessary to complete the development of the material resources of the state" would
be broadened by the inclusion of language "or other public uses." This language
alleviates our minor concern that your original language may actually limit the ability to
proceed with an inverse condenmation action given an Idaho Supreme Court case which
held that the constitutional provision is not a limitation on determining what constitutes a
public use. With the inclusion of this language, we feel that your proposed legislation
adequately conveys your intent.
I hope this letter is of assistance to you. If you have any questions, please
feel free to contact me.
Very truly yours,

7M~THOMAS F. GRATTON
Deputy Attorney General
Intergovernmental & Fiscal Law Division
TFG\yj
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